Quo Vadis, German Liberalism?
The FDP hasn’t merely lost an election. It has reached an inflection point.
This result is not just a historic defeat—it marks a rupture in the trajectory of German liberalism. There is a very real probability that this defeat could mark the beginning of a slow (and under certain dynamics: inevitable) decline of politically organized liberalism in Germany.
That risk is real. And it must be named.
In recent weeks, many have debated causes and responsibilities. But most of these conversations remain stuck in familiar terrain: some complain that their policy priorities weren’t sufficiently visible (curiously, both the social and economic liberal wings argue this); others blame the campaign or personnel. Understandable—but ultimately beside the point. Let’s be clear: It’s not enough.
The position papers published so far mostly aim to steer the party in a particular direction—and thus remain shallow in substance and short-sighted in strategy. Put differently: they are (more or less) useless for anyone genuinely concerned with the future of liberalism in Germany.
What German liberalism needs now is a moment of deep self-reflection—and the courage to think beyond the familiar. Liberals in Germany need a phase of serious, almost ontological self-examination. It takes guts to let go of old certainties. That’s where I see my responsibility as someone trying to offer impetus. I’m convinced that many sharp minds within the liberal family are already having these conversations (and likely with better ideas than mine). But since time is short and the FDP is stagnating in the polls, I’ll take the first swing—in the hope that the party will follow suit, especially by engaging actors currently outside formal party structures. More on that later...
These reflections do not pursue an internal agenda in the sense of “the FDP should become more market-oriented” or “more progressive.” That’s petty and parochial. Instead, I want to offer provocations and ideas for how liberal politics in Germany can be rethought, beyond its current Gestalt but with a clear view of institutional realities.
The current Zeitgeist doesn’t call for quick fixes, but for deep, structural reflection about the role, function, and future of liberal politics. Not only the FDP is under pressure; but liberal ideas themselves have come under fire.
This kind of reflection also requires conceptual freedom. So I’m laying out a few thought models and working hypotheses as heuristics to rethink liberal strategy from the ground up. They range from macro-political shifts (§1–3) to questions of operational practice (§4–7).
My working hypotheses:
- “Assume the FDP is dead.” How would one rebuild politically organized liberalism in Germany—without the baggage of current structures, identities, and routines?
- No taboos. The German party system needs a radical rethink. Let’s not dismiss any scenario prematurely. We need to explore all options and constellations seriously.
- There is no going back to 2017, 2021, or whenever. The political context has profoundly changed. Anyone who wants to simply reconnect with former successes fails to grasp the tectonic shifts in society and the party system. The NPC-level response “Let’s return to our guiding principles!” is a dead end.
I will share a few preliminary thoughts. It’s important to underline: these are not ready-made solutions, but provocations and impulses—designed to help structure the party's internal reform process and widen what remains a shockingly narrow corridor of debate. Especially given the intellectual and generational narrowing of the FDP before its electoral collapse in February, this step is long overdue.
// §1 — Dutch Lessons? Navigating the Liberal Schism
I’ve written elsewhere about the changing political landscape in Germany. We’re witnessing a reordering of the party system’s coordinates. There’s no going back. Liberals need to adapt to this new reality.
In short: Because of deeper societal shifts, we’re moving beyond the old left-right spectrum of postwar politics—social democracy vs. center-right reform conservatism. In today’s multicultural, technologized, and technocratic world, political cleavages are no longer about economic models—but about identity, openness, and global integration.
Two poles have emerged with fundamentally opposing visions: the open society of liberalism vs. the closed society of populism.
As always, such shifts are gradual and often contradictory. The global social democratic crisis showed this—survived only by pivoting toward new constituencies (e.g. urban, progressive voters over traditional labor). But social democracy now plays a supporting role in this new ideological landscape.
Liberalism faces a similar, perhaps deeper identity crisis. It’s split along two axes:
- Cosmopolitan liberals—whose natural habitat, due to their urban and educated profile, increasingly lies with the Greens.
- National liberals—some of whom now lean toward the CDU or even flirt with the AfD electorate.
The FDP sits uncomfortably in the middle—and is being torn apart.
This diagnosis leaves us with two existential choices:
- An intentional split between national-liberal and cosmopolitan-liberal camps. In other words: the FDP could focus on its traditional, economically liberal base—ceding the urban-progressive vote to a new party. Or vice versa. This would mirror developments in countries like the Netherlands (VVD vs. D66), Sweden, or Denmark, where liberalism now exists in two distinct parties. So: Will the FDP become a VVD…or a D66?
- A deep internal reform à la the Greens. Like the “Fundis” and “Realos” of the Greens, such a path would institutionalize power-sharing and develop a sustainable modus vivendi. But this would require more than cosmetic tweaks—it would mean structural change (e.g. mandatory parity) and a culture of internal tolerance and reform.
Or, for the ever-optimists, there’s also:
- The “Happy-Clappy Delulu” option. The party pretends it can continue to bridge both camps—without real reform.
IMHO, that’s pure wishful thinking. No liberal party in Europe has pulled that off long-term. The data on voters and members strongly suggest that this middle road leads nowhere.
To be clear, I’m not endorsing one option here. But any future leadership must take the reality of this schism as a starting point. Ignoring it will mean structural, cultural, and ultimately electoral failure.
// §2 — Metapolitics As Praxis: Liberalism Beyond the Ballot Box
For decades, the FDP essentially monopolized the liberal brand in German politics. But this centralization starved the broader liberal ecosystem.
Liberalism doesn’t exist in cultural discourse outside party politics anymore.
And yet, even in the lobby of the FDP’s training academy in Gummersbach hangs the famous quote from Theodor Heuss:
“You can’t make culture with politics—but perhaps you can make politics with culture.”
We need metapolitics again—not just chasing votes, but shifting discourse. We must reclaim the liberal narrative in Germany.
Others have long understood this: The Greens mainstreamed climate transformation through metapolitical strategy. The far-right did the same with “remigration.” Both left and right invest in pre-political spaces. We liberals outsource the meaning of liberalism to ZEIT columnists!
Let’s be honest: Outside of occasional op-eds in the FAZ, we’re irrelevant. TikTok? Campus? Cultural spaces? We’ve vanished.
A political movement needs cultural resonance to stay relevant. Regardless of the FDP’s polls—Germany must become more liberal again.
That means reclaiming key concepts, shaping new narratives, and building alternative media ecosystems—creators, podcasts, influencers, YouTubers, artists, writers.
These can’t be self-sustaining. They need to be embedded in a broader liberal mosaic: publishing houses, think tanks, intellectuals, journalists, civil society actors—people who carry liberal ideas into society. Not through marketing firms, but through a network that not only enriches itself organically, but is also driven by our Weltanschauung.
As Gramsci taught: Political power is won through cultural dominance, not just elections.
§3 — Quit the Status Quo: Liberalism as Utopia
The FDP embodies the postwar West German republic: statesmanlike tone, familiar aesthetics, pragmatic politics—but structurally sluggish and rhetorically dated.
That worked when liberalism was still mainstream. We didn’t even feel the need to label our democracy “liberal”—we just assumed it was.
A fatal mistake.
Populists filled the void. We lost both narrative control and conceptual clarity. Meanwhile, parts of the liberal world remain stuck in Cold War reflexes, labeling any state action as “socialism!!11!!” instead of adapting liberalism to today’s realities: populist discourse, geopolitical fragmentation, societal strain. (BTW: the Freiburg Theses are not cutting-edge anymore… lol.)
This intellectual laziness leaves liberalism sidelined and idea-less. Not just in the FDP—but across the liberal ecosystem.
We need a new narrative: bold, intellectual, visionary.
We need a political utopia again. Not just technocratic policy tweaks—but a vision of liberalism in 2050.
Because “Bureaucracy reduction” won’t cut it anymore.
We need spaces for new ideas. A Mont Pèlerin moment if you will. Thankfully, we have our own magic mountain in Gummersbach wink. Sadly, the FDP preferred middle-management and committee culture over intellectual avant-garde. There is no space (let alone recognition) in the party for the Dahrendorfs or Hayeks of our time.
This is not the time for procedural motions. It’s time to imagine anew.
Only if we regain the ability to think big—like our political opponents already do—can liberalism regain cultural relevance in Germany. We need a liberal version of this:
// §4 — Enough with Gut Feelings: Data, Numbers, Target Groups
What might sound like a pragmatic recommendation—”Let’s just look at the numbers”—is actually much more complex: polling isn’t prophecy. Anyone who approaches data with a preconceived narrative will find that data affirming nearly any story they want.
That’s why we need an agnostic attitude toward the paradigm question outlined in §1. The future strategic positioning of German liberalism must not rest on wishful thinking, but on a sober reading of voter flows and audience dynamics within the specific German context.
What’s needed is a data-driven core team—composed of real tech wizards and data scientists, not gut-feel delegates—working alongside our international partners (VVD, DA, Momentum) to analyze the core questions from §1 and develop actionable insights.
That also means looking beyond our own voter profile. A data-literate FDP must investigate questions such as:
- Can the monolithic AfD voter bloc be broken apart?
- What’s the internal dynamic between the party’s social-populist flank (“We must address the social question”) and its nationalist-liberal wing around Alice Weidel?
- Are there pressure points that can be exploited?
Remember: no taboos.
At the same time, we must also explore the other end of the spectrum:
- Is there a realistic path to win over cosmopolitan voters—currently aligned with the Greens—for a reimagined FDP? Or is that a dead end due to party loyalty?
Here’s one testable hypothesis: The Greens operate in a volatile political market. Their base tends to have low party loyalty—classic swing voters. (Our friends at D66 know what I’m talking about.) Yet the Greens in Germany have somehow built a surprisingly stable core within this capricious milieu. Breaking into that base might be harder than many FDP members hope. The potential may be lower than it appears from an intellectual distance.
How do we deal with that?
With all of these hypotheses, the point isn’t what we prefer—it’s what the data tells us. Any liberalism that wants to reinvent itself must—à la Popper—learn to ask the right questions and have the courage to test them empirically. Results matter more than applause at party conventions.
Because at the end of the day, it’s about one thing: Liberals need to start winning again. And that requires clear analysis, hard choices—and the willingness to accept tough trade-offs.
// §5 — Rethinking Party Structures: No More “Ochsentour”
Programmatically, the FDP is a liberal party. Structurally, however, it remains conservative and outdated. Its internal architecture has barely evolved since its founding—and I say this with over 20 years of party membership on my shoulders (wtf!).
This isn’t just about the times changing. We can directly trace many of the party’s weaknesses to its structural rigidity—an issue visible in other traditional parties, too.
Take the oft-lamented low quality of some Bundestag members. It’s not because Germany lacks capable liberals. It’s the result of an antiquated recruitment pipeline, where spots on state lists are still earned through the “Ochsentour”—endless appearances at every local association meeting. Who has time for that?
In practice, excellence and committee presence are almost perfectly negatively correlated.
This obsession with staying power is not enough to produce the innovative, responsible, and inspiring leadership that today’s political challenges demand. Content renewal must be accompanied by personal renewal—at every level of the party. You won’t attract high performers if your talent pool is dominated by low performers.
It’s not just about what we represent, but also who represents it—and how we define and develop political leadership.
A liberal party in the 21st century must systematically invest in leadership development. Empirical research shows that parties like the FDP—rooted in committee culture—drift over time from the median voter.
So let’s name the structural dilemma clearly: Yes, the FDP has a constitutional duty to facilitate citizen participation. But that doesn’t mean party members should automatically define strategic direction.
What’s missing? Clear leadership structures and strategic capacity.
These aren’t revolutionary demands—they’re long-overdue reforms:
- Introduce dual leadership and separate office and mandate. Spare us the ideological drama. Leadership structure is a management decision, nothing more. These two steps alone would double the leadership pool, diversify the party’s public face, and allow real talent to flourish. While the FDP is represented by one or two faces, the Greens routinely present ten or more.
- Build a leadership academy and structured development program. Many current FDP decision-makers—especially elected ones—are underqualified to represent a party that stands for dynamism, intellectual openness, and modern leadership. Let’s be blunt: Some MPs can’t even define liberalism, let alone lead teams effectively. At least 30% of leadership resources should go into talent development—just as any serious organization would. The good news: the liberal network already has the infrastructure. Use the Naumann Foundation. Every liberal leader in Germany should pass through the Gummersbach school. Other parties—like South Africa’s Democratic Alliance—do this systematically. Arguments pointing to the JuLis as a talent pipeline don’t hold up. I’m a product of the JuLis myself—but most of my learning was in procedural motions, not leadership.
- Develop an autonomous liberal ecosystem.
One more structural challenge: German liberalism has been monopolized by the FDP for decades. Nearly every affiliated group is directly tied to the party or staffed by its insiders. A future-ready leadership must be open not just to outside input—but to amplifying it.
The goal: a real liberal ecosystem. Independent think tanks, intellectuals, strategists, content creators, agencies. **These actors should enrich the party—not be controlled by it. See §2.
// §6 — German Liberals Must Look Internationally (And Start Listening)
Anyone active in international liberal networks quickly notices a pattern: German liberals love to teach—but rarely like to learn. When we send delegates to global conferences, they often arrive to lecture—not to listen.
That has to change.
The political realignment described in §1 is global. In some societies, it’s well advanced; in others, just beginning. German liberals could learn a great deal by systematically studying international case studies—and drawing lessons.
So far, however, we’ve been surprisingly self-satisfied.
What we need is a structured, regular exchange between FDP leaders and liberal strategists around the world. That includes an international power broker—someone who can embed the FDP into a broader global network of liberal actors: sister parties, think tanks, campaign experts, data scientists.
We liberals love to praise globalization. But we often operate in a provincial German silo. Let’s not fool ourselves: German politics isn’t so unique it can only be understood in isolation.
What does this mean in practice?
The FDP needs an International Officer with real strategic responsibility—not someone who smiles through conferences, but someone who integrates global experience into Genscher-Haus.
They need the clout and format to bring the best minds to Germany—for input, dialogue, and concrete cooperation. In the past, this role was either handed to junior staff without influence, or to MPs too busy to lead. We can’t afford that anymore.
More than that, party leadership itself must be willing to learn. We ask our Naumann Foundation partners to engage with our ideas. That expectation must also apply to us. The quiet arrogance that assumes we’ve nothing left to learn? That’s not liberal. That’s parochial. And it needs to stay in the past.
// §7 — Strategy Requires Leadership: A 100-Day Plan for “Project 2029”
At the start, I argued that German liberalism needs time for reflection. But let’s face it: the world won’t wait for us to be ready.
Whether the FDP pauses for soul-searching or not—politics marches on. That’s why any new party leadership must combine long-term strategic thinking with immediate operational capacity.
Right now, as disillusionment with the “small coalition” grows, we need leadership that’s ready to hit the ground running.
Part of the current vibe shift is this: people no longer believe politics has to be slow and sluggish.
A new FDP leadership must stand for getting things done. Structural change and strategic reboot can’t mean a painfully slow process of regional conferences. New leaders must arrive with a plan—and deliver.
One image stays with me: The Argentine minister for modernization has a countdown calendar in his office showing how many days he has left. It reminds him daily how little time there is to make change.
The next FDP leadership should adopt that same urgency.
Specifically: within 100 days of taking office, the new leadership must present initial results and a roadmap for a long-term “Project 2029.” Only after that should members, affiliates, and the public be brought in—not before.
Because if nothing happens in that time, current trends will continue: the FDP hovers at 3–4%, with zero strategic momentum. And each week of inaction loses not just voters—but the last remaining sympathizers.
Project 2029 starts now.
Only a leadership that grasps the strategic complexity—and has the courage to change course—can give German liberalism a fighting chance.
This paper was written in the spirit of Voltaire:
“Judge a person by their questions, not their answers.”
I look forward to the debate. Because one thing is clear: We need to start asking uncomfortable questions.
Sven Gerst, April 2025
So dunkel diese Zeit für einen freiheitsliebenden Menschen auch sein mag, sie wirkt auch als Magnet für Besserwisser, zu denen ich mich mit einigem Stolz selbst zähle, Opportunisten und natürlich für nun zurückkehrende ursprünglich vergraulte Anhänger. Aus dieser bunten Mischung ergibt sich dann vor allem das, was wir aktuell betrachten können: Flügelkämpfe um die Deutungshoheit über die Ausrichtung einer, nein, DER liberalen Partei: nämlich der einzigen liberalen Partei, die jemals in der Bundesrepublik bundesweite Bedeutung erlangt hat – und somit über den wahren Begriff des Liberalismus. Diese reinigende Entwicklung ist dabei nur zu begrüßen, da sich die FDP in den letzten Jahrzehnten nicht nur thematisch stark verengte und ihrem eigenen Programm aus übergroßer Machtgier und lupenreiner Prinzipienlosigkeit heraus den Rücken kehrte, sondern sich durch das Abhalten störfreier Jubel-Parteitage jeglicher programmatischen Dynamik entledigte.